



## CONTENTS

02	:	Foreword by Director General
04	:	85 Years since Foundation of the Security Police of the Republic of Estonia
08	:	Personnel
10	:	Counterintelligence
13	:	Protection of State Secrets
14	:	Protection of Constitutional Order
20	:	Combating Terrorism
27	:	Combating Corruption
34	:	From Investigation of Timeless Crimes to Information War

## Foreword by Director General

Dear Reader, it is my pleasure to introduce the sequent Annual of the Security Police Board. First of all, we must point out events that were highly significant for Estonia, as in 2004 we attained several public reindpendence-time tasks of utmost importance – accession to the European Union and NATO. Membership in organisations that have uniform democratic principles and goals is the main basis and guarantee for Estonia's security that influence the security approach of Estonia and our society as a whole. Estonia's role has changed, because besides our contribution to guaranteeing mutual security we have an opportunity to participate in making decisions on joint security policy and activities.

Unfortunately several tragic terrorist acts took place in Europe in 2004. The train-explosions in Madrid on March 11, 2004, were a shock to every person from the Pyreanean peninsula to Scandinavia raising the issue of our vulnerability and the question, whether the effective protection of the security of the Member States is altogether possible. As current threat of terrorism is more extensive than all previous threats, we must look at it from more global aspect also here, in Estonia. We support in every way the efforts of the European Union that would help to turn our mutual living environment in Europe safer and reduce possibilities to commit terrorist acts.

Within the limits of its capacities the Security Police Board actively participates in international cooperation to reduce the threat of terrorism. In addition to that we have enhanced national counter-terrorism measures. Prevention of terrorism in Estonia is one of the most important tasks of the Security Police. Combating terrorism has been successful only due to joint efforts of various agencies and here the Security Police would like to thank everybody for the work done.


Ascertaining and combating factors endangering our security lays great responsibility on a special service like ours. Accession to international organisations has increased the volume of state secrets and the number of persons coming across state secrets. The Security Police considers especially important the joint efforts of all public departments in



guaranteeing protection of state secrets and is ready to share knowledge in this sphere.

In connection with performing security tasks I would like to point out one more aspect. The basis of Estonia's security policy, amended in 2004, provide that the Security Police, in order to perform its tasks and shape the state's security policy, collects and processes information on the basis of which the main principles of the state's security policy will be developed. Thus, the purpose of collecting information is preventing individual crimes, as well as developing and applying the measures guaranteeing security in more general meaning.

I am sure that the Security Police can successfully fulfil its tasks in the future, as well, and together with its partners we are able guarantee safe living environment in Estonia.




The largest towns in Estonia (by road; km)

Town	Population 01.01.2004	Distance from Tallinn
Tallinn	396 375	-
Tartu	101 297	185
Narva	67 355	212
Kohtla-Järve	46 346	156
Pärnu	44 568	129
Viljandi	20 422	159

Ethnic composition of Estonian population

Nationality	%
Estonians	68%
Russians	26%
Ukrainians	2%
Others	4%



## 85 Years since Foundation of the Security Police of the Republic of Estonia



Aleksander Hellat (1881–1943) – the Minister of Internal Affairs during whose term of office the Security Police was founded.



The first Head of the Security Police, Captain Helmut Veem, awarded with the Cross of Liberty I/3 (1894–1941).

### Dear Reader!

Although this annual reflects and records the events and activities of the Security Police Board in 2004, it reaches the reader in spring 2005, 85 years after the public department known as the Security Police was first established in the Republic of Estonia.

Between two wars, in 1920–1940, execution of counterintelligence and anticipation, prevention and proceeding of crimes aimed against the state were the task of the police department first called the Security Police (1920–1925) and later the Political Police (1925–1940).

However, which is the date that we should account as the birthday of the Security Police? Is it November 12, 1918 – the foundation day of Estonian Police (when some of the policemen actually started to execute the tasks of the latter security police), or April 12, 1920 (when the *Regulation on the Security Police* of the Republic of Estonia was adopted), or May 1, 1920 (when the Head Office of the Security Police set to work in Tallinn)? As appears from the article dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the Police, published in the "Estonian Police Gazette" in November

1928, written by Johan Sooman, the chief of the then Political Police (at the same time the Vice-Director of the whole Estonian Police), the involved persons had no consensus in this matter at that time, as well.

While there is some disagreement about the dates, the same does not apply to persons. The launching of the Security Police as an institution with special tasks associates above all with the name of Aleksander Hellat (1881–1943). Aleksander Hellat, who graduated from St. Petersburg University as a lawyer, was the first Estonian to become a chief of militia in Tallinn (1917–1918), i.e. he was basically the creator of Estonian Police and the developer of its legal basis. He became the mayor of Tallinn in November 1918 and the Attorney-General of Estonia in July 1919. On July 11, 1919, the Government decided to form a committee consisting of the Minister of Internal Affairs (social democrat Aleksander Oinas), the Minister of Court (member of the National Party Jüri Jaakson) and the Attorney-General (Aleksander Hellat), "who would promptly make a proposition about the political police."



Locations of the newly established departments of the Security Police in 1920.

Compiled by Major J. Saldlo. Drawn by Reserve-Captain N. Subbotin.

Subordination of the new institution brought along disputes at once: whether it should be under subordination of the Ministry of Court (like, for instance, the predecessor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the USA, found in 1908) or under subordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in order to emphasize it being a police institution, like in France, former Tsarist-Russia and Finland). According to the project of the Ministry of Internal Affairs the Department of Political Surveillance should have been established at the Head Office of the Police, subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the goal being the surveillance of political mentality of the population, as was the purpose of the General Staff Administration's Department of Collecting Military Information during the War of Independence). The Government Decision from August 1919, which appointed the Security Police under subordination of the Ministry of Court, ended the dispute. In January 1920 the Minister of Court Jüri Jaakson took a position that the tasks of the Security Police do not correspond to the tasks of the Ministry and declared his opposing position to the Government. On January 28, 1920, the Government ordered the Minister of Internal Affairs to develop legal basis for the Security Police and to organise the agency. Since then the Security Police has been connected with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Under the management of Aleksander Hellat the initial legal basis of the Security Police was developed and the agency was actually established. As a result Estonian Government adopted the *Regulation on the Security Police of the Republic of Estonia* on April 12, 1920, and according to Article 1 of the Regulation the Security Police for combating political crime was founded under subordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On May 1, 1920 the Head Office of the Security Police started operating in Tallinn and a 23-year-old General Staff officer, owner of the Cross of Liberty, Captain Helmut Veem (1894-1941) became the first Head of the Security Police. The Tallinn Department of the Security Police was located at the Head Office, as well. Other departments were formed of the reconnaissance points of the General Staff Administration's Department of Collecting Military Information:

TARTU	1. June 1920
VALGA	1. June 1920
VÕRU	2. June 1920
PÄRNU	5. June 1920
RAKVERE	9. June 1920
KURESSAARE	16. June 1920

Additional departments were formed in:

VILJANDI	13. July 1920
NARVA	1. August 1920
HAAPSALU	1. August 1920
TAPA	15. August 1920

The fact that similar territorial structure – except some minor variations due to the previous compulsory Russification in North-East Estonia – has helped the Security Police, re-established in 1991, to operate successfully for over ten years by now, speaks in behalf of the expedience and efficiency of such structure.



The following establishment and engagement principles of the new agency might be mentioned:

- 1) the regional structure coincided with the locations of the reconnaissance points of the General Staff Administration's Department of Collecting Military Information;
- 2) together with the structure the majority of the reconnaissance points' personnel was taken over;
- 3) a large number of former military were hired;
- 4) those former policemen, who had not been involved with the political police (*ohranka*) of Tsarist Russia were hired;
- 5) every attempt was made to differ from the former tsarist regime and win the approval of public opinion;
- 6) efforts were made to implement new democratic methods.

The working results of the new agency in 1920 (8 months actually) confirm the need to establish the Security Police as a counterintelligence service of a young state.

Publicly were disclosed:

24	spies
7	underground communist organisations
13	distributions of broadsheets
14	deserters
98	persons who participated in the atrocities of Bolsheviks
3	criminals
8	persons who stored unlicensed weapons
5	smuggling cases

876 persons were arrested, of them:

58	spies
106	members of underground communist organisations
27	distributors of broadsheets
78	persons who participated in the atrocities of Bolsheviks
26	instigators against legal public order
72	instigators to illegal political strikes and interferers of others work
10	smugglers
5	persons having secret contacts in Russia
26	persons who secretly crossed the border to Russia
3	criminals
8	persons who stored unlicensed weapons
4	speculators with foreign currencies
14	deserters
439	suspects and illegal residents

Of the arrested persons:

- 261 were prosecuted,
- 245 were presented for sending out of the country,
- 272 were released due to lack of charge.

Two armed conflicts took place in which one security police official was wounded.

Such was the beginning of the 20-years activity of the Security Police/Political Police in protecting the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the Republic of Estonia.

As regards Aleksander Hellat, the man who most influenced the development of the Security Police, he spent the next 20 years (1920-1940) in public service as a foreign envoy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Supreme Court. His fate was closely related to that of the Republic of Estonia: after Estonia was occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union, Hellat was arrested by the NKVD on September 24, 1940, and perished supposedly in a prison camp in Kemerovo on November 28, 1943.

## Personnel

The personnel of the Security Police Board can be characterised as willing to work and avid for learning, but also youthful. The average age in the Board is 33 years, of whom 43% are under 30. For the first time during the work of the Security Police the average length of service exceeds 7 years, while the length of service of most of the officials is 9 years. Constant increase of the length of service expressively shows the efficiency of personnel administration and the stable development of the service as a whole.

In their everyday work our officials come across various acts of law and the thorough knowledge of legislation is one of the backbones of our activity. Thus, the main course of personnel administration is to recruit competent, loyal and educated officials. At the same time the Board supports aspirations towards still higher education in every possible way. As at the date of December 31, 2004, 59.8% of our officials had higher education, 18 of them acquired their diplomas in 2004. It would be interesting to point out that in 1998, when an ambitious goal was set up that the amount of officials with higher education should amount to 80% in the future, the actual amount of those with higher education was only 30%. Today we may recognise with satisfaction that the achievement of the one time goal in the nearest future has become quite realistic.



Due to particular features of the service and requirements set before the officials of the Republic of Estonia we pay much attention to various courses. From year to year opportunities to send our officials to domestic and foreign courses have increased. At the same time our specialists participate in international seminars and conferences, where besides gaining knowledge they can also share our experiences. Due to the threat of terrorism expanding all over the world the importance of trainings/schoolings aimed at combating terrorism has constantly increased. International crisis management training DIVEX'04 carried out in Estonia in summer 2004, where the officials of the Security Police both participated and were the leaders, is the best affirmation to the above mentioned.

A traditional motto of the Security Police Board is "A sound mind in a sound body!" Various possibilities to exercise have been created for the officials: weekly use of swimming pool, fitness club and gymnasium. Our employees have achieved outstanding results in various sports, e.g. for the second year in succession our team won the volleyball competition held between the agencies under subordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Continuously popular are the summer and winter events of the Security Police where besides sporting people have time to relax, as well.



*Awarding the best cooperation partners of the Security Police Board in 2004, with the Minister of Internal Affairs Margus Leivo attending. Handing over inscribed firearm to Colonel Alar Lanemann, the Head of the General Staff of the Defence Forces (below); handing over the Plate of Merit of the Security Police Board to Ene Rebane, the Deputy Director of the Citizenship and Migration Board (above).*



Memorable moments from the year 2004. Summer event in Uusküla, at Lake Peipsi. Celebration of the end of year in Tallinn.



## Counterintelligence

The Security Police Board as the counterintelligence agency of the Republic of Estonia has mainly been interested in the special services of the CIS-states and some Asian states until now. In connection with the increasing threat of terrorism in the world the occasional activity in our region of the special services of some Near East countries has been added to the above mentioned.

Estonia's accession in 2004 to two influential international organisations – NATO and the European Union – immediately brought along perceptible change in counterintelligence activity of foreign special services aimed against Estonia. The intelligence services of Russia are still active, although the on-site activity of their local agents was inefficient in 2004 according to the opinion of the Security Police. Contributing to Russian communities in Estonia did not justify itself and thus the interest of Russia's special services in them decreased, as well. Reforms currently carried out in the field of "compatriots" support directly confirm the failure of previous policy.

Instead of influencing and making use of local Russian community they have started to concentrate more intensely on Estonian officials, especially after the Russian parties failed at the parliamentary elections in 2003. The most active and systematic activity of Russian intelligence fell to the second half of 2003 and the first half of 2004, ending with

the expulsion from Estonia of the two intelligence officers of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) who acted under diplomatic cover. The high-ranking officer of European Bureau of the SVR, Lieutenant-General Anatoli Klimkin and Major Jevgeni Golubkin, who has previous experience from Asia, had to leave due to activity inappropriate for a diplomat, as they tried to interfere with the activities of Estonian parties.

Expulsions took place directly before the elections of the European Parliament when the SVR tried to mobilise the members of Estonian Russian community who have the right to vote (according to Russia's opinion the best anti-Estonia lobby-channel), in order to win seats to European Parliament. After the disclosure and "disqualification" of the prominent intelligence-duet the SVR kept low profile in Estonia until the end of 2004.

For years one of the main tasks of Russia's intelligence services in Estonia has been observation of domestic and foreign policy and political influence on events important for Russia. Insistent attempts to use the structures and Member States of the European Union as a foothold for their activities accrued to the former methods in 2004.

Military intelligence (GRU) changed its tactics after the year 2000, when overt operational action was taken out of the territory of Estonia and military intelligence became especially interested in Estonian embassies.

*The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) officer Jevgeni Golubkin, who acted as the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy, performing his principal tasks.*





However, secret operations against Estonia have never ceased. At present Russian military intelligence officers have switched to a new technique – spies working under diplomatic cover in other European countries try to find access to interesting spheres or persons in Estonia. At the same time it should be emphasized that Russian military intelligence has always been quite conservative: the Head Office of the General Staff of Intelligence is always fully present in the states they are interested in. Until now the GRU has been most interested in the activities of Estonian public officials in international organisations. Estonia's accession to NATO only increased and intensified the interest of Russia's military intelligence towards Estonia.

Intelligence activity proceeding from Russia is characterised by continuous and numerous attempts to recruit and influence Estonian citizens and residents. So far the practice confirms that persons visiting Russia are "taken on" without choosing: among them have been public officials, businessmen, small entrepreneurs, students. Federal Security Service (FSB) continuously plays the leading role in this forceful recruitment, but some cooperation has been observed with other above mentioned special services, as well.

Recruiters or Russian special services are mainly interested in Estonia's power structures (the Security Police, the Border Guard, the Police, the Customs Service) and politicians, but also access to them, to regional

policy executed in border districts and to many other things. They always seize any opportunity to apply the so-called active measures. In consequence of reforms introduced in 2004 the influence and authority of Russian special services in Russia has increased and due to that the activeness and size of recruitment have increased also.

According to the Security Police this is an important security threat: the purpose of recruitment attempts carried out among Estonian citizens visiting Russia is to create a network of agents necessary for information collecting and influencing. It should be pointed out here that such tactics is not risky: it is difficult for Estonian special services to have complete and timely knowledge about campaigns carried out in relation to Estonian citizens that take place across the border and thus it is difficult to execute effective preventive work. It should be emphasized that there have been several cases when either blackmailing or physical violence have been applied, and only very strong persons can resist that. Treating ordinary citizens, who are accustomed to democratic standards and convictions, with barbarian recruitment methods of a despotic society can quite often be successful.

As the Security Police's choice of countermeasures and their application efficiency in such cases depends, first of all, on the amount of information and the preciseness of details, we ask all Estonian citizens and residents who have become the victims of recruitment, recruitment



attempts or any other attempts of influencing in the territory of Russia by their special services or power structures, to inform the Security Police of such attempts immediately and fearlessly. On the one hand, informing is necessary to guarantee the security of these citizens (it will prevent the possibility to blackmail in the future) and on the other hand, to prevent potential crimes aimed against Estonia.

Counterintelligence is only one section in the complex of security measures. Every public official must understand that the success of foreign intelligence activities depends on the consciousness and discipline of officials, because the purpose of intelligence officers is not only to purchase documents that have been declared state secret, but also to collect sensitive information. The aim of intelligence is to collect information concerning decision processes in the target-country and potentially influence such decisions. Intelligence officers try to influence public officials via their personal problems, as well as via their ambitions.

Cooperation with other European countries should be considered important, as well. Cooperation must enhance among Estonian public officials the concept of belonging into uniform Europe and with that the obligation to protect the secrets of other countries in order to guarantee better the security of the European Union.



*The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) resident Anatoli Klimkin (at the right), who acted as the adviser of the Russian Embassy, showing the Old Town of Tallinn to a high-ranked colleague from Moscow, who is making a control visit.*



TOP SECRET

## Protection of State Secrets

On the one hand, the year 2004 was quite an ordinary year in protecting state secrets, but on the other hand, there were several significant milestones in the development of protection of state secrets as a system.

On September 7, 2004, the Security Police Board issued the first access certificate to a legal person and several more such certificates will be issued in the nearest future. Legal persons possessing such certificate acquire opportunity to participate in international procurements, where the most important precondition is to pass security clearance and possess certificate for access. Security clearance of a legal person is an important step from the aspect of public protection of state secrets, because in the course of security clearance the capability of a legal person to protect state secrets is evaluated from various aspects, and this will guarantee more efficient protection of state secrets all in all.

The second half of the year 2004 saw the beginning of an extensive discussion about the necessity to carry out security clearance in relation to those persons, who possess access to state secrets due to their position – first of all the members of the Riigikogu (parliament) and the members of the Government. The necessity to perform security clearance results from international commitment that Estonia undertook,

as several international organisations, above all NATO, which transmit information to Estonia do not allow persons, who have not passed security clearance, access to classified information.

Taking into consideration the increase in the number of persons processing classified information – e.g. surveillance information collected by surveillance agencies will soon become state secret on "Restricted" level; the number of persons who come across classified information connected with NATO and the European Union increases – the Security Police turns even more attention to trainings concerning state secret and lays adequate training schemes both, in the nearest future and in longer perspective.

From the negative aspect the year 2004 will be remembered as the 'year of the Defence Minister's briefcase': on October 30 the briefcase consisting classified documents was stolen in Tartu from the private residence of the then Minister of Defence. This incident is an example of how disregard by a high-ranked official of rules fixed for protection of state secrets may result in the loss of important documents and damage significantly the reputation and reliability of both, the corresponding ministry and Estonia in the eyes of cooperation partners.



## Protection of Constitutional Order

In 2004 Russia continued active implementation of topics connected with compatriots, harnessing these issues to their foreign policy, aimed against both, Estonia and the Baltic States. Russia's noisy declarations and announcements concerning protection of compatriots' interests continually lie in selfish influencing of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia and using suitable propagandistic rhetoric in bilateral relations with international organisations and with the Western Powers. It is Russia's ongoing attempt to take advantage of the mentioned propagandistic "card" in order to achieve both, internal and foreign policy goals. On foreign policy level it, first of all, means that Russia tries to weaken the position of the Baltic States on international level. By referring to "constant violation of human rights of compatriots" Russia tries to bargain better starting-points or conditions in relations/negotiations with NATO and the European Union.

The most important institutions that implement Russia's chauvinist foreign policy are still the Administration of the President of Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Duma. Although several changes took place in the President's Administration and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the course of the administrative reform implemented in 2004, no direct changes concurred with them in the relations with Estonia and in the subject of compatriots. Resulting from Russia's internal reforms the role of various compatriots' funds and

regional units (the Municipality of Moscow) in influencing the processes among compatriots in Estonia has decreased. The activity aimed towards compatriots converges into the hands of the central power more and more. The impact of Russian special services increased both, in Estonia and on international level, in order to have more effect on the Western Powers' decisions and estimations about Estonia.

In 2004 an overall tendency to avoid direct confrontation in bilateral relations was observable in Russia's foreign policy. Russia preferably takes advantage of Estonia's accession to NATO and the European Union, because it gives an opportunity to exert pressure upon Estonia via NATO, European Union and other international organisations. Russia's activity aimed against Estonia via international organisations and third countries can be considered even more dangerous than direct opposition, because Russia tries to take advantage of the criticism proceeding from the so-called friendly countries.

The activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and its Embassy in Tallinn considerably increased in connection with the subject of "compatriots," whereby it was their role in guiding or manipulating the Russian-speaking population that increased most. It was the Embassy that set up direct tasks for various "compatriots" organisations (meaning: political orders), promising them funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in return. Such funding is done





*The veterans of the former Soviet Army in service of Russia's ideology and ambitions of local Russian politicians.*



under the auspices of supporting Russian-language education and culture. This tendency doubtlessly continues in 2005, as well, because funds in the state budget of the Russian Federation intended for financing compatriots have increased compared to previous years.


Several most important Russian organisations connected with "compatriots" subject – the Union of Russia's Compatriots' Organisations together with its sub-organisations and the Information Centre of Human Rights – were directly or indirectly led by the Russian Embassy in Tallinn, simultaneously depending on the funds from Russia. The leaders of the above mentioned organisations have regular contacts with the Embassy of Russia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, from where they constantly receive guidelines and instructions about their further activity, but also financial support for carrying out actions. These organisations continuously transmit information and report to the Embassy about their own activities and about the events taking place in the political landscape of Estonia. Political surveys and analysis compiled for the Embassy are necessary for Russia to outline its foreign policy. In 2004 the Security Police Board observed several direct cases where the Embassy of the Russian Federation dictated the activity of local Russian organisations in certain situations by using financing as leverage.

A new, continuously increasing tendency was active involvement of "compatriots" into affairs and issues that would enable to connect Estonia and other Baltic States with fascism on international level. Attaching the label of "fascism" to Estonia has been Russia's universal propagandistic method for years already. By that Russia tries to achieve foreign-policy oppression of internationally authoritative Jewish community against Estonia. Besides Estonia and Latvia Russia has tried, in

connection with the political events in Ukraine, to attach this rhetoric to West-Ukraine, as well. At the same time the internal developments and statements in Russia have expressively proved that actual and extensive anti-Semitism is mainly represented in contemporary Russia itself.

As Russia's long-term purpose is to bind Estonian Russian community with Russia by means of education and culture, Russian Embassy in Tallinn tried to attune local Russian-speaking community against education reform and attempted to incite them to action. Nothing new was invented: they decided to use the scenario that had been proven tactically successful in Latvia. Influenced by Russian ideologists, who initiated troubles against Latvian education reform, and with direct participation of the Moscow-inclined members of Latvian Seim (parliament) Tatjana Zhdanok (the delegate of European Parliament since 2004) and Juris Sokolovskis an active campaign in support of actions aimed against Latvian education reform was attempted among Estonian Russian community in autumn 2004. However, the campaign did not find much response in local Russian community.

According to the Security Police the organisers of this "solidarity"-campaign, in order to carry out the campaign and demonstrate schoolchildren's support, tried to take advantage of under-age pupils of the schools of Ida-Virumaa, who were to be brought to Tallinn to participation at the demonstration under the pretext of class-excursion. In compensation the organisers were kindly ready to finance these false excursions. The money to arrange "protestation" was given to the activists from Latvia in order to achieve more extensive and "international" response to the events in Latvia and to generate "crisis situation" in Estonia that would resemble the one in Latvia. Particular cynicism of



the activists of Estonian Russian community is expressively proved by the fact that they even intended to take advantage of mentally disabled children residing in Ida-Virumaa. The plan was to take them to the demonstration in Tallinn without the knowledge of their parents and teachers. Such methods demonstrate eager observance or even developing of the "creative" legacy of the notorious propagandist of the Third Reich Joseph Goebbels by local Russian ideologists.

Despite all attempts the "protest demonstration" organised with foreign money and according to foreign scenario failed completely: 10 organisers-activists expecting extensive participation were the only demonstrators. Not a single schoolchild, Russian or of any other nationality, came and that clearly shows the attitude of local Russian community towards the issue of education of the Russian-speaking population, imposed upon Estonia by Russia.

Although on international level Russia constantly criticises the problems in Estonia and incapability to integrate local Russian community into Estonian society, its own activity under the label of "helping compatriots" is directly aimed against it and instead of that serves the goals of binding local Russian community to Russia.

The foreign-policy attempts of the Russian Federation to create the European Union Russian Party strive to expand and enhance its influence in Europe. On June 4, 2004, the representatives of the Russian parties of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Norway and Cyprus signed in Prague the declaration on forming the initiative group for creating the European Union Russian Party. The purpose, ignoring the prin-

ciples of the European Union, is to create a party on ethnic basis in order to unite Russians living in the Member States of the European Union and to "protect their interests." The declaration obliges to establish contacts with the press and organisations that unite Russian-speaking people in European states and to apply access of Russian-speaking candidates to the European Parliament. In addition to that the declaration calls to collect signatures in support of Russian-language education in Latvia and Estonia.

Via election of one the leaders of Russian community into the European Parliament Russia can make itself heard in the European Union and this is one of the main courses of action of Russia's new foreign policy. In order to give more influence to this voice they need to unite all Russians living in the European Union into one (easily controllable) political power.

The Security Police prognosticates continuous insistence of "compatriots" subject by Russia on foreign-policy level in every possible context, especially in the context of protection of human rights. The emphasis in this connection is constantly on international organisations (EU, NATO, OSCE, UN) and the spearhead is still pointed at influencing Estonia via management bodies of these organisations or via the Member States.



*Few Russian young people, manipulated from behind the frontier, performing "anti-fascist campaign" in Tallinn ...*

### Extremism

According to the Security Police the number of extremist organisations or persons with extremist views did not increase in Estonia in 2004. However, processes taking place in the world and in Europe influence Estonia, as well.

If we look at the sequence of terms "radicalism" – "extremism" – "terrorism," then "extremism" is the central link of this chain-of-terms and the logical stage of activity preceding terrorism. Terrorism is the most extreme and violent form of extremism that results directly from extremism. Every country must act strictly and firmly in order to protect the society from extremism. That is why one of the primary tasks of the security services all over the world is preventive activity among extremist organisations and persons. It must start with observation of the very first radical occurrences, because, if we take into consideration international experience, transition of radicalism to extremism and from there to terrorism is very likely and thus very dangerous, as it might seriously endanger public order and territorial integrity.

Due to active counteraction of the Security Police, Russian extremism that had some support in Estonia in 1990s does practically not exist any more, because it lost its ground. At the same time we must be on guard that the extremism of Russian origin would not be replaced by new phenomena proceeding from Europe. Estonia's accession to the European Union and considerably easier travelling across the borders of the Member States has created preconditions for spreading extremist views and methods of activity popular in Europe. Several European extremist movements with set structures are interested in finding new and more extensive grounds to their activities and they might make attempts to expand to Estonia.

Of extremist groups that have been active in Estonia so far, only a small group of skinheads has survived and their activity is limited to occasional (music) events. Although there are skinhead organisations all over Europe, none of them has succeeded in expanding their activity to Estonia. Estonian skinheads have still close contacts with adherents in Finland. Low activity of Estonian skinheads is best expressed by the fact that only one concert was organised in Estonia in 2004. Finnish skinheads and Finnish bands also took active part in this concert. The number of participants on that concert amounted to 100 sympathizers with such ideology and music, of them 30 skinheads from Finland.





*Eduard Limonov and his national bolsheviks racketing in Russia, using equipment inspired of National Socialism. Where does fascism really rear its head?*

# Combating Terrorism

## Prevention of International Terrorism

### International Situation

Despite international efforts in combating terrorism several terrorist acts with numerous victims took place in the world in 2004, whereby it was Europe that terrorism affected more than previously. On March 11 a terrorist act with the largest number of victims took place in the capital of Spain, where 10 bombs exploded simultaneously at the railway station in Madrid, killing more than 200 people and injuring over 1450 people. Another important event in Europe – the murder of the movie director Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands – once again affirmed another dangerous tendency – deepening of the radicalisation of Moslems who enjoy the advantages of the democratic welfare-society of Europe. Due to the last-mentioned factor the European states are more and more often becoming the targets of terrorist attacks unlike previously, when Europe was mainly used for financing terrorism. Distribution of radical views among young Moslems has brought along more extensive recruitment for Al-Qaida and other terrorist organisations in Europe: it is easy to recruit sympathizers of radical views, Moslems, who are disposed against Western culture for planning and executing terrorist acts.

Another terrorist act in 2004 that shocked the entire world was the hostage taking of schoolchildren and teachers in Beslan, North Ossetia on September 1. 1200 hostages were taken, and as a result of exchange of fire between terrorists and Russian troops at least 330 people were killed. Although it was considered unlikely that terrorists might attack children, the Beslan event showed that terrorists are ready to do anything in order to achieve their goals and they choose unanticipated targets for their attacks. In the future the Beslan terrorist attack might be patterned by others, above all the terrorist groups connected with Al-Qaida, by attacking schools and other child-care institutions.

The epicentre of terrorism in 2004 was nevertheless Iraq, where terrorist acts, but also attacks against coalition forces constantly took place during the year. In the composition of coalition forces Estonian soldiers suffered the first losses, as well. The hope that Saddam Hussein's arrest will stabilize the situation in Iraq to some extent and the number of attacks decreases have unfortunately not come true. A new terrorist method in Iraq in 2004 was hostage taking of foreigners in a large scale. As shortly after the Madrid terrorist acts socialists came to power in Spain, they called back the Spanish troops from Iraq and that actuated

Islamites to seek new alternatives for attacking the countries combating in Iraq in order to force them to take out their armies. Thus, hostage taking of civilians from various countries spread in Iraq. At the same time hostages have been the citizens of such countries that are not participating in the Iraq war (e.g. France), and this indicates that the purpose of hostage takers besides demand to take out military forces is also cynically demanding ransom.

As before, Al-Qaida and organisations connected with it are behind large-scaled terrorist attacks. Here the supposed Al-Qaida attack to the USA Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on December 6 can be pointed out. This attack was above all noteworthy by its selection of target: previously terrorists mainly attacked vulnerable or so-called soft targets, this time the object was the USA Consulate with very high security measures. Thus the attack was interpreted as Al-Qaida's "reminder" of its strength. Video recordings of Al-Qaida leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri that reached publicity in October and November served similar purpose. It was media campaign refreshing Al-Qaida's image among Moslems.

### The Interest of Islamists from Foreign States towards Estonia

2004		2003	
Visa applications	Refusals	Visa applications	Refusals
1973	550	2278	172

Latest developments show that immigrants from various Islamic states have become more and more interested in Estonia. Mainly their purpose is to go from Estonia to West Europe (most of all into Scandinavian countries), as Estonia's accession to the European Union has significantly facilitated such opportunities. At the same time, with the increase of welfare and living standards in Estonia the number of immigrants who wish to stay here increases, as well. On the basis of other states' experiences the danger in both cases is that among immigrants-Islamites might be persons connected with terrorist organisations or persons with extremist views, or persons with common criminal background.

Here we can bring as an example the case of a Turkish and Sweden citizen of Kurd nationality Hemo Heybet Amedsson. In the first half of 2004 it was identified that Amedsson, who has repeatedly visited Estonia, is punished under criminal procedure in Sweden, the reason being his contacts with criminal groups with Kurdish background, and Kurdish extremist groups. Therefore, on the second half of March 2004, the



*The Security Police officials at anti-terrorism training.*

Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Calls	78	228	624	896	820	947	838	1 444	1 369	1 301	1 086	1 016	1 180
Explosions	3	41	71	81	44	40	41	35	31	25	24/14*	30/16*	14/7*
Deceased	2	5	1	10	6	6	7	5	2	3	1	5	5
Injured	2	10	11	26	24	20	6	16	18	9	7/2*	19/7*	16/4*
Bomb Threats	7	97	125	221	161	150	184	445	454	214	93	98	54
of these to schools	6	45	28	63	45	56	91	251	235	112	48	52	27
Suspected bombs					135	102	100	148	222	206	179	132	305
Explosives detection				52	58	86	278	296	537	384	70	83	79
Damaged explosives	228	1 466	1 958	4 046	1 898	10 949	2 152	2 340	1 437	1 347	1 669	2 875	1 952
Explosive devices confiscated by the Security Police				22		60	7	4	7	4	2	4	7
Explosives confiscated by the Security Police (kg)			1 10	3343,3	üle 600	üle 100	98	46	25,5	16,2	11,9	6,5	31,5

Calls to explosives removal. Mines, explosive devices and explosives liquidated by the Rescue Board and confiscated by the Security Police in the course of surveillance. 25.05.1992 – 31.12.2004  
\* Explosions of explosives

Security Police Board filed an application to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to add Amedsson to the national list of obligation to leave and prohibition on entry, and the Minister of Internal Affairs acceded the application.

On June 15, 2004, Amedsson was apprehended during illegal crossing of the border of the Republic of Estonia and a punishment of 30 days of administrative detention was imposed. It was ascertained via Interpol that Amedsson is wanted by the Turkish Police under another name (Heybet Acikgöz) in connection with terrorist crimes. At the hearing in the Tallinn City Court, held on August 6, 2004, permission to extradite Amedsson to Turkey was admitted as legal. However, the Republic of Estonia decided not to settle Turkey's claim: as a citizen of Sweden, Amedsson was extradited to Sweden. On the basis of the case in question attention should be drawn to the fact that border control is simplified in relation to the citizens of the European Union. It means that Amedsson is not controlled upon entry to Estonia, whether he is in the national list of prohibition on entry. Therefore it is likely that Amedsson will make attempts to come to Estonia in the future, as well. In order to prevent Amedsson and other persons with criminal or terrorist background to come to Estonia, compensation mechanisms should be rapidly established that would be of help in the situation of simplified border control, where Estonia has no actual knowledge of persons who have entered the country.

### Prevention of Financing Terrorism

As the law enforcement bodies and special services of different countries have prioritised the freezing of the funds of terrorists, international terrorist organisations have been forced to implement new schemes to finance their activity. One important method of financing Islamic terrorism is collecting contributions, supposedly for charity and "spreading Islam." Thus, several worldwide Islamic charity organisations are suspected of connexions with terrorist groups. Al-Haramain Foundation can be brought as an example: in 2004 several of its European branches were added to the UN list of organisations connected with Al-Qaida. Proceeding from the above mentioned information exchange with foreign partners becomes much more important than prevention of financing terrorism – the purpose being identification of charity organisations supporting terrorism and collecting information about persons either living in Estonia or visiting Estonia, who might be connected with such organisations. In order to prevent financing terror-

ism via Estonian financial institutions the Security Police Board controls transactions that have caused suspicion that money is being transferred to terrorist groups. Common crimes, above all drug trafficking, illegal immigration and smuggling, are used to finance terrorism, as well. Therefore the Security Police obtains information about those criminals in Estonia, who might be involved with financing international terrorism via their "business partners" abroad.

### Prevention of Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking of Strategic Goods

One of the important areas for the Security Police Board in combating terrorism is prevention of proliferation and illicit trafficking of strategic or dual-use goods. Although the danger of application of weapons of mass destruction was and is minimal, there is still a chance that attempts will be made to take via Estonia to the West materials for producing weapons of mass destruction originating from military objects or poorly controlled factories of Russia and southern republics of the former Soviet Union. Therefore information collecting on persons who might be interested in illegal transit of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear materials via Estonia and control over enterprises that deal with strategic and dual-use goods is important, in order to identify potential illicit trafficking of such goods. Two cases connected with illicit trafficking of radioactive material can be mentioned from the year 2004:

- ⋮ On January 7, 2004, the Security Police officials stopped in the Lääne-Viru County, at the Vaeküla crossroad on Tallinn-Narva Road a jeep Ssang Yong Musso, from where they found a cardboard box surpassing natural radiation level for 100 times. Radiation source in this box was a container for storing radioactive source, in which low enriched uranium U-238 is used for shielding radioactive material. The container itself was empty. The persons in the car were Valeri Gubinski and Vadim P., who gave dissimilar explanations about their connections with this container. On October 18, 2004, the Tallinn City Court convicted Valeri Gubinski (Valery Gubinskiy) in illegal radiation practice on the basis of Article 411 sec. 1 of the Penal Code and punished him with pecuniary punishment in the amount of 300 daily rates (15.000 EEK); compensation levies in the amount of 3721 EEK and court expenses in the amount of 2940 EEK were exacted into public revenues from Gubinski.



Selection of radioactive objects discovered by the Security Police in 2004. Hazardous inheritance of the Soviet Union seems to be inexhaustible.

- On July 17, 2004, a Ukrainian citizen Georgi M. arrived in Estonia via Narva customs office in a "Euroline" bus. A grey box weighing about 1.2 kg was discovered from his luggage – a so-called tool box, which radiation from the distance of 10 cm was 34,35 microSv/h. The Security Police initiated criminal proceeding on illicit trafficking of prohibited goods requiring special permit on the basis of Article 392 sec. 1 of the Penal Code. Expert analysis verified that the box weighing over one kilogram contained 6.95 grams of radium powder Ra-226. As Georgi M. had not been previously punished and did not cause damage to anybody criminal proceedings was terminated on October 20, 2004.

The Security Police continues anticipation and prevention work in this field. Continues information collecting on persons, enterprises and structures that could be interested in illicit trafficking or transit via Estonia of radioactive or nuclear materials, also other strategic goods or weapons of mass destruction or parts of such weapons. The background of enterprises, which apply for permits to export or import strategic goods or goods requiring special permit will be examined. Information will be collected to find out the origin of confiscated chemical compounds and the purpose of their subsequent use. Special attention should be paid to this problem in connection with increased threat of terrorism in the world and in connection with unfavourable results on the state's reputation, if materials originating from Estonia or materials illicitly trafficked via Estonia should be used for terrorist acts in some other country.

### International Crisis Management Training

Although the threat of terrorism could be considered low in Estonia, all agencies connected with crisis management must be constantly ready to act in such situations. At the joint international crisis management training *Sarex-Divex*, organised on July 20-30, 2004, in the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace, an anti-terrorism operation was carried out under management of the Security Police at the Tallinn Bay. The main purpose of this training was to practice cooperation between civil and military structures in the field of crisis management. According to the scenario of the training the power structures had to arrest armed terrorists, who had planned a terrorist act and were trying to escape from Estonia by ship. Strategic decision to arrest the terrorists in as secure place as possible – at the Tallinn Bay – was carried out under the leading of the operative staff and the "terrorists" were made harmless. The cooperation between different agencies succeeded, giving a lot of experience for joint operations to come. The crisis management staff led by the Security Police consisted of representatives/liaison officers of ten agencies. Besides cooperation between Estonian agencies the international side of the training was important, as well: ally troops and technical means of NATO were used at joint operations. There were over 200 participants at this training of anti-terrorism operation. The joint training was one part of the large-scaled training of military structures coordinated by the General Staff of the Defence Forces.



### State Visits and Large-scale Events

According to the valid cooperation procedure of the Security Police Board and the Personal Protection Service on guaranteeing the security of protected persons and objects the Security Police Board applies measures to anticipate, prevent and reveal potential attacks. Increased threat of terrorism all over the world and above all in Europe demands meeting increasingly better security requirements at international meetings and large-scale events. Our responsibility in guaranteeing the safety and stability of secure environment has increased in connection with accession to the European Union and NATO. The risks here are attacks or illegal undertakings executed by terrorists, extremist movements or psychologically unstable persons.

Visits of the heads of states and heads of governments of foreign countries and leaders of international organisations and representations are under public attention in Estonia as well as outside Estonia, placing exceptional responsibility on law enforcement agencies at guaranteeing the security of protected persons and objects. The danger prognosis, considering all potential security risks, prepared in the preliminary stage of such events is accomplished as a combination of collecting information and analytical work done by the Security Police. After that plans of action for shutting out various risks prior, during and after the event are provided. The Security Police participates in implementation of security measures in protecting guests, attendants and objects connected with them.

In 2004, among other events, the Security Police participated in guaranteeing security at the 5th Summit Meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Baltic Sea States that took place in June and at the quarter session of the Military Committee of NATO held in Tallinn in September. One of the security measures was intensifying control at border crossing on the basis of the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs before these two events. More thorough control at borders justified itself as a preventive measure and proved the necessity to implement such measure

in the future, as well. In order to avoid endangering the event from air-space the air traffic in this space was restrained and the security perimeters of surrounding territory were specified. An important moment at implementation of the above mentioned measures is coordinated cooperation between different agencies and structural units that guarantees prevention of potential dangers and risks.

### Detection of Explosions and Disposal of Illegal Explosives from Circulation

According to statistics 7 explosions of explosive devices and explosive materials took place in the Republic of Estonia in 2004 – 5 persons perished and 4 were injured. Compared to the year 2003 – 16 explosions with 5 perished and 7 injured – the number of explosions is constantly decreasing. However, the number of perished and injured has remained nearly the same, mainly due to suicides executed by the use of explosives. Similar to the amount of bomb explosions the number of bomb threats has constantly decreased, as well. 54 bomb threats were made in 2004, of these 27 were made to schools (98 in 2003, of these 52 to schools). The employees of the Security Police detected and neutralised 7 self-made explosive devices.

The analysis of the decrease tendency of explosions of explosive devices and materials shows that it is, above all, due to longstanding systematic counterwork of law enforcement authorities, among others also the Security Police Board. Parallel to pre-trial investigation the Security Police has paid a lot of attention to decreasing the amount of illegal explosives in civil circulation. The latter is most important from the aspect of prevention of explosions. Although the quantity of explosives left in illegal circulation has become quite inconsiderate, it is inevitable that a certain amount of illegal explosives will remain in circulation. Resulting from the above mentioned it can be said that the total number of explosions in Estonia is amounting to its potential minimum.

The percentage of explosions carried out in connection with conflicts



*International joint anti-terrorism training Divex '04.*

within criminal circles has decreased constantly. Most of the explosions are committed either to solve private affairs or due to incompetence to handle explosive materials. Incidents with persons committing suicide by means of explosives are occurring constantly: there were 2 suicidal explosions in 2004, just as there had been in 2003. The tendency of self-murderers, who, in case their own problems accumulate, are ready to explode others with them, is troubling. The first such incident took place in Pärnu, in "Port Artur" department store in 2002, where a young man tried to explode himself due to personal reasons. While no bystanders were fortunately hurt there, then on November 25, 2004, a man supplied with a bomb-belt detonated himself together with a female police officer in Õismäe district, Tallinn. In this explosion died the self-murderer himself and Constable Julia Gorbatchova (21.06.1974 – 25.11.2004) from the North Police Prefecture. Three policemen within reach were injured, also. Two of the seven explosions carried out in 2004 were committed as suicides, where 3 persons were killed and 3 injured, which makes up predominant majority of the total number of perished and injured in explosions in 2004.

In order to avoid the occurrence of criminal explosions in the territory of Estonia, for many years the Security Police has held among its priorities, besides pre-trial investigation of occurred explosions, to identify and disclose persons illegally preparing and handling explosive materials and explosive devices. The latter is especially important from the aspect of prevention of explosions, as it is obvious that if the quantity of explosives in illegal circulation would decrease, the total number of explosions would decrease, as well. In 2004 the Security Police Board initiated 7 criminal cases in connection with self-made explosive devices. Besides that 31.5 kg of various explosive materials, 15 grenades, 22 grenade detonators, 47 detonators of different purpose, 1 shell, 8 illegal firearms and 2599 cartridges of various calibre and purpose were collected from civil circulation and made harmless.

In 2004 decision was made in the criminal case on Lauri Lilleväli, from whose home the West Police Prefecture in cooperation with the Pärnu Police Department found in the course of search 1 unidentified rifle with self-made butt, 1 magazine of an automatic weapon "Kalashnikov," 5 explosive packets ALP-10, 2 training grenade detonators UZRGM, 2 grenades RGD-5, 1 electric detonator and 148 cartridges of various calibres. In the course of criminal procedure it was ascertained that Lilleväli bought the mentioned grenades, cartridges and explosive packets from the instructor of the National Defence League's Pärnu Unit Heigo Tagam. On November 2, 2004, Pärnu County Court punished Lauri Lilleväli for

illegal handling of explosive device and firearm with 2 years conditional imprisonment with 3 years probationary period, and Heigo Tagam with 4 years conditional imprisonment with 3 years probationary period.

On March 26, 2004, the officers of the Security Police, on the basis of previously received information, detained Nikolai Kurnassov at Tartu Bus Station. In searching his luggage were discovered and seized 9 kg of explosive material and 10 electric detonators, which he had intended to sell to a person not yet identified. During preliminary investigation it was ascertained that Kurnassov had got the detonators from his acquaintance Sergei Maksimov, who lives in Tartu. On June 22, 2004, Tartu County Court punished Kurnassov for illegal handling of explosive materials with 3 years imprisonment and Maksimov with 2 years conditional imprisonment with 1 year and 9 months probationary period.

On May 7, 2004, the officers of the Security Police detained Jevgeni Kozlov. As a result of search one detonator, one grenade detonator UZRGM, two sections of blasting fuse OSP, 4.4 kg of explosive material, five 5.6mm cartridges, a gas pistol "Agent" and one non-functioning rifle "Mauser." During preliminary investigation it was ascertained that Kozlov had acquired the explosive material by way of smelting it from the II WW shells. On September 10, 2004, Narva City Court punished Jevgeni Kozlov for illegal handling of firearm and explosive material with 3 years and 6 months imprisonment with 3 years probationary period.

The Security Police continues to collect information and realize it in connection with persons, who might be interested in illegal handling of firearms and explosives, and manufacturing explosive devices. Besides more attention is paid to illicit trafficking of explosives and firearms on international level, because after Estonia's accession to the European Union the border control has slightly weakened. Due to that it might be attempted to use Estonia as a transit country of illicit trafficking of firearms and explosives.

## Combating Corruption

The priorities of the Security Police in combating corruption in 2004 remained nearly the same as were during previous years. The work in this field was still divided between three main directions:

- ⋮ combating corruption in civil and administrative cases, in pre-trial and judicial proceeding of offences and in penal institutions;
- ⋮ combating corruption among tax authorities and at border;
- ⋮ combating corruption in the Ministries and their central divisions.

A new, fourth direction was added in 2004 – revealing corruption connected with the use of funds accruing through international organisations or foreign countries.

### **Corruption Connected with the Activity of Law Enforcement Authorities**

In connection with corruption within law enforcement authorities the Security Police concentrated on revealing corruption in prosecution authorities and police. In this field corruption risks are mainly connected with making procedural decisions for bribe or gratuity, but also due to personal contacts.

According to opinion corruption risks within prosecution authorities have increased significantly since implementation of the Criminal Procedure Reform (on July 1, 2004) and it might be stated conditionally that most corruption risks that were previously attributed to the police have now passed to prosecution authorities.

In assessing corruption risks within prosecution authorities more attention should be paid to unofficial associating between prosecutors and advocates. It must not be excluded that criminals often try to estab-

lish closer contacts with prosecutors via advocates. However, information concerning criminal connections of prosecutors and advocates should always be handled carefully and it must be thoroughly controlled in advance. Sometimes the advocates with dubious background take advantage of the myth about associations between lawyers in order to increase their income and to ask additional payments of their clients. There have been cases where such dishonest advocate gives his/her client an impression that in order to get favourable result he/she must use some of his fee for bribing police official, prosecutor and judge, but later it appears that no such thing has actually taken place. Rumours about general venality of officials spread due to unethical behaviour of some such advocate. Such action harms the reputation and credibility of the whole state in the eyes of ordinary citizens.

For instance, in 2004 the Security Police took to court a sworn advocate with long-standing employment history M. H., accused of fraud. It can be seen from the files of the criminal case that M. H., during staging a criminal offence, gave to his client an impression that in order to hasten the proceeding of criminal case the client must give a bribe in the amount of 3000 EEK to the district prosecutor of the North District Prosecutor's Office. In the course of surveillance it appeared that M. H. had not given a bribe to the prosecutor, but had acquired all the money received from the client. Noticeable and kind of curious here is the fact that the prosecutor whom M. H. had to bribe according to his words was not even connected with the proceeding or supervision of this case. The judicial proceeding of this criminal case is currently in process.

In case of police corruption the highest corruption risks are connected with taking bribe or gratuity during preliminary investigation of criminal cases and during execution of misdemeanour procedure. Although



*Customs official Peeter Ventsel – a gambler in a casino.*



the following crime scheme disclosed by the Security Police is not directly connected with taking bribe or gratuity in legal meaning, corruptive motives can be found in the behaviour of the official in this case.

Namely, in 2004 the Security Police took to court leading police inspector of the East Police Prefecture Illar Männi, accused in misuse of official position and extortion. During preliminary investigation it was ascertained that Illar Männi as a police official required of the person held in custody the payment of the sum amounting to 32 000 EEK. Of the mentioned sum Illar Männi promised to give 27 000 EEK via a judge of the Ida-Viru County Court, whom he claimed to know, to another judge of the same court, so that in the course of pronouncing the judgement the latter would release this person from custody and would not impose maximum possible punishment. As a result of surveillance it appeared that Illar Männi did not know these judges at all and had no intention to pass them the money. In this case we are dealing with one potential scheme of extorting bribe or gratuity, where the defenceless situation of the person under custody is exploited and an impression is given already during the initial stage of preliminary investigation that for certain payment the case could be turned to their benefit or to their prejudice. The court convicted Illar Männi of misuse of official position and extortion and punished him with 18 months imprisonment.

#### **Revealing Corruption among Tax Authorities and at the Border**

Compared with previous times the conditions on disclosing corruption connected with the activity of tax authorities have considerably changed. Merging of the previously separately functioning Customs Board and Tax Board contributed to this by changing thoroughly the tax authorities' organisation of work. In addition to the changes accompanying the merger of the boards, Estonia's accession to the European Union and ending of customs control at internal frontiers of the European Union entailed major changes into the work of tax authorities.

The major corruption risks in relation with tax corruption are still connected with the carrying out tax audits and official investigations. Thus, the entrepreneurs with dubious background are much interested in bribing some tax official of acquaintance, so the latter would help them solve in the bud the problems emerging during audit and thus influence the possible course of latter investigation on tax frauds committed by them. Besides the above mentioned corruption risks one of the

tendencies demanding more attention is leakage of information within the institution. Above all, various enterprises performing collection service or competing enterprises in Estonia and outside of Estonia are interested in all kind of tax information. In more complicated cases even trade-related or industrial espionage might be involved.

In 2004 the Security Police took to court the former chief tax auditor of the Tax Board Priit Karumaa, accused of giving bribe and communicating inside information. During preliminary investigation it was ascertained that on request of his acquaintances from Russia Priit Karumaa systematically collected information concerning business activity of one fuel company acting in Estonia. Besides, he took advantage of his position and repeatedly turned to other tax and police officials in order to get miscellaneous information. Thus, as a result of surveillance and in the course of staging a criminal offence an event was ascertained, where Priit Karumaa gave a bribe in the amount of 6.500 EEK to a high police official for receiving the statement of the fuel company's bank account. In the course of detention the Security Police officials found by Karumaa the summary on the fuel company, which contained thorough information on the company's business activity, flow of funds and background of persons connected with the company.

On the basis of information collected during preliminary investigation Priit Karumaa was to be paid 90.000 EEK by the persons with the background of Russian security structures. Here we can no longer speak of common corruption because a counterintelligence aspect, interesting from the state's position, accrued to this case. The court convicted Priit Karumaa in communicating inside information and giving bribe and punished him with 2 years conditional imprisonment with 3 years probationary period.

During last years the Security Police has treated customs and border corruption in its information collection uniformly by collecting information concerning corrupt customs officials and border-guards simultaneously. This is caused by an increasing number of cases in the practice of the Security Police, where criminal groups dealing with illicit trafficking or across-border tax frauds try to recruit besides corrupt customs officials also corrupt border-guards for bribe or gratuity. The main risks of border and customs corruption are connected with not recording potential infringements and imposing minor penalties or avoiding the imposing of penalty. Regrettably such cases, where a



*Migration official Artur Aganich cynically demanding bribe from a hospitalised subordinate.*

corrupt official authorises on criminals' request and for bribe or gratuity the entry of illegal goods without controlling, or helps criminals to commit concealed tax fraud, are quite numerous in the practice of the Security Police.

The Security Police took to court the Head of the Airport's Customs Point of the Tallinn Customs Inspectorate Peeter Ventsel, accused of taking bribe. During the preliminary investigation it was ascertained that according to the request of the sales manager of one company, Peeter Ventsel released from the so-called red corridor or from regular physical control the goods coming through the custom's control zone. After performing this action Peeter Ventsel asked from the mentioned sales manager for bribe in the amount of 16.000 EEK under the pretence of loan. It is notable that some of this money Peeter Ventsel gambled away in the casino right after receiving it. The court convicted Peeter Ventsel and punished him with 1 year 6 months conditional imprisonment, with 18 months probationary period.

In 2004 the Security Police initiated criminal procedure in relation to several customs officials of the Narva Road Customs Point of the North East Customs Inspectorate and border guard officials of the Ida-Viru Border Guard District, who are suspected of systematically taking bribe for not controlling illegal goods coming from Russia to Estonia and for leaking operative information. During preliminary investigation it was ascertained that the customs officials of the Narva Road Customs Point of the North East Customs Inspectorate M. M., I. K., J. S., A. S. and J. Z. authorised for bribe the entry of different cargos of illegal goods without controlling. For their illegal activity they received for every spirit cargo at least 3.000 EEK and for every cigarettes cargo up to 2.500 EEK.

It is noteworthy that besides the customs officials several Border Guard officials of the Ida-Viru Border Guard District were connected with this illicit trafficking scheme, as well. They repeatedly received bribe from smugglers for leaking operative information entered into the databases of the Border Guard Board. During the preliminary investigation it was ascertained that non-commissioned officers of the Border Guard R. R. and U. P. controlled on smugglers' request and for bribe, whether the trucks might cross the border without fearing control, or whether, according to the information contained in the databases, they belong under immediate checking.

It appears from the materials of the criminal case that at the North East frontier of Estonia the smugglers had "fed" quite a safe and risk-free channel via which they could transport all kinds of illegal goods from Russia to Estonia without the fear of being caught. The Security Police in cooperation with the Tax and Customs Board's Investigation Department revealed the illegal activity of the above mentioned customs and border guard officials. In the course of a joint operation the Tax and Customs Board seized two trailer trucks, specially adjusted for illicit trafficking, and discovered from their hiding-places altogether 260 boxes of cigarettes "L&M," "Bond," "North Star" and "More" carrying the tax stamps of the Russian Federation. According to preliminary calculations the loss caused to the state by non-payment of import taxes amounts to 2 205 720 EEK. In connection with this case of illicit trafficking the Tax and Customs Board detained as suspects V. Z., V. R., I. S., V. S. and A. B.

#### **Revealing Corruption in the Ministries and in Their Central Divisions**

In revealing corruption in the Ministries and their central divisions officials taking bribe or gratuity are, as before, under focused attention of the Security Police. Thus, in 2004, the Security Police initiated criminal proceeding in relation to the former head of IT of the Ministry of Social Affairs H. T., who is suspected of systematically taking bribe from at least six IT companies. It appears from the materials of the criminal case that H. T. systematically violated the procedural rules of the Ministry's IT-procurements and influenced the service providers to pay him bribe for purchasing goods and services. With his illegal activity H. T. caused damage to the state, because most of the services and goods were purchased for prices considerably higher than the market prices. Noteworthy here is the fact that H. T. started illegal activity in the end of the year 2003, immediately after coming into state public service from private sector, and during less than a year he managed to receive bribe over 332 000 EEK. The majority of these bribes the IT companies transferred on the basis of fictitious invoices onto the accounts of two business enterprises led by H. T.'s former mate. Services marked on these invoices had in reality never been provided and the bribes actually covered personal expenses of H. T. It can be said that the basic business activity lied in concealing H. T.'s corruptive activity.



In addition to the above mentioned, in 2004 the Security Police took to court the former Head of the Visa and Illegal Immigration Department of the Citizenship and Migration Board Artur Aganitch, who required bribe from his subordinate in return for premiums and bonuses. The case is especially curious due to the fact that the official paid to the superior larger sums than the sums received as premiums. The court convicted Artur Aganitch of taking bribe and imposed pecuniary punishment on him.

Other similar examples might be brought, as well. In 2004 the Security Police prosecuted the Director of Tallinn Employment Office Marju Rein accused of misuse of official position. According to the materials of the criminal case, with fictitious order Marju Rein appointed to the posts of consultants in Tallinn Employment Office two persons, who over several years gave part of their salary in cash to Marju Rein monthly. The court convicted Marju Rein of committing the crime and imposed pecuniary punishment on her.

Besides bribery and gratuity cases the main corruption risks in the Ministries and their central divisions are connected with misuse of official position with the purpose of personal benefit. Official position is often abused by violating procedural restrictions provided in the Anti-corruption Act. Basically the infringements in this field are connected with giving unnecessary benefits to certain enterprises in purchasing their goods or services. Often such benefits are created due to personal interest and personal benefit. There have been cases of preferring enterprises connected indirectly or directly with the official himself/herself in organising public procurements.

In case of minor infringements of procedural restrictions provided in the Anti-corruption Act the Security Police has applied misdemeanour procedure in relation to the offender. Serious infringement, on the other hand, may bring along even criminal liability to the person, because according to the new Penal Code corrupt acts can be treated as crimes, if the caused damage is considerable. The act in such case is qualified according to the article on misuse of official position. At the same time the Security Police has experienced some legal problems in connection with distinguishing corruption crimes and infringements.

Procedural work has shown that in case of corruptive acts the offender does not cause actual property damage to anybody, but as a result of unjustified benefits receives financial profit. Harming the reputation of public institution can, of course, be considered as damage, but it cannot be considered sufficiently concrete criterion in distinguishing corruption crimes and infringements. According to the Security Police corruptive acts should be criminalized irrespective of the amount of caused damage, also distinguishing of corruptive crimes and infringements should rest upon different bases. Crimes and infringements could be distinguished not on the basis of caused damage, but, for instance, on the basis of the volume of transactions.

The Security Police has always paid much attention to infringements of the Anti-corruption Act. Some more serious cases deserve to be mentioned here. In 2004 the former Deputy Head of the Financial Department of the Citizenship and Migration Board Illar Ehala was prosecuted for infringement of procedural restrictions and rules on carrying out public

*Corrupt taxation official Priit Karumaa gathering inside information in order to execute an "outside order."*





*Sworn advocate M. H. cheating "payment" out of a client.*

procurements provided in the Anti-corruption Act. According to the materials of the criminal case Illar Ehala agreed with his acquaintance that the latter's business enterprise will win the Citizenship and Migration Board's tendering procedure on cleaning and tidying duties provided that some of the work will be done by the company belonging to Illar Ehala's son and wife. After coming to an agreement Illar Ehala organised the Citizenship and Migration Board's tendering procedure on cleaning and tidying duty and his acquaintance's enterprise won the contract. In reality, the company belonging to Illar Ehala's son and wife did most of the work that had been the object of the procurement.

In 2003, on Ehala's initiative, a construction company belonging to his acquaintance, which had contractual relationship with the Citizenship and Migration Board, also concluded sub-contracts with the company belonging to Ehala's son and wife on cleaning and tidying duties. Besides, during the preliminary investigation it was ascertained that in 2003 Ehala ordered some of the cleaning and tidying duties directly from the company belonging to his son and wife. With such activity Ehala infringed both, the requirements for carrying out procurements and the procedural restrictions provided in the Anti-corruption Act. The total sum of orders Illar Ehala tried to direct to the company belonging to his son and wife amounted to 510 000 EEK. The court convicted Illar Ehala under compromise procedure of infringement of rules on carrying out public procurements and imposed pecuniary punishment on him.


In 2004 the Security Police prosecuted for infringement of procedural restrictions provided in the Anti-corruption Act in connection with mis-

use of official position and power the Head of the Rear Division Staff of the Battle Support Unit's Tapa Basic Training Center Peeter Veltmann and the Warrant Officer of the Head of the Transport Unit of the Rear Center Jaak Lindpere. During the preliminary investigation it was ascertained that during many years Peeter Veltmann and Jaak Lindpere had purchased various goods and services for military units for nearly 1.85 million EEK from the business enterprise where they were shareholders. Additionally Peetr Veltmann purchased goods for military units from another business enterprise, where he and his sister had shares. Thus, Peeter Veltmann and Jaak Lindpere infringed procedural restrictions provided in the Anti-corruption Act, according to which an official may not close a transaction or conclude other similar transactions of similar type or with conflict of interests with himself/herself.

Officials' prolonged, systematic and frequent infringement of illegal activity characterises the criminal case in question. Notable here is the fact that Veltmann and Lindpere transmitted some of their official duties to the business enterprise connected with them and the latter acted as a supplier of the military unit, choosing necessary goods and fetching it. The court convicted Peeter Veltmann and Jaak Lindpere of misuse of official position and power and punished Veltmann with 14 months conditional imprisonment with 18 months probationary period and Lindpere with 6 months conditional imprisonment with 18 months probationary period.

In 2004 the Security Police prosecuted the former heads of Rakvere Viljasalv Ltd. V. S., M. K. and S. K. for misuse of official position. During





*The silent witness of Rakvere grain-theft.*

the preliminary investigation it was ascertained that from 2001 to 2004 V. S., M. K. and S. K. illegally used nutritive rye and wheat belonging into the state's security reserve stored in Rakvere Viljasalv Ltd. in their own business interests by selling it in Estonia and abroad in the form of grain and flour. The heads of Rakvere Viljasalv Ltd. started illegal sale of the grain belonging into the state's security reserve, taking advantage of the increase of price in spring and decline in prices in autumn, hoping to earn profit at the market by selling large quantities of grain. The plan did not work and all in all the illegal activity of V. S., M. K. and S. K. caused more than 28.64 million EEK property loss to the state. Discussion of this criminal case is not finished, yet. However, this case clearly points out that control and supervision over storage and preservation of the state's security reserves should be decisively made more severe in the future.

#### **Corruption Connected with the Use of Funds Accruing through International Organisations or Foreign Countries**

A new direction in combating corruption was added in 2004 – disclosing corruption connected with the use of funds accruing through international organisations or foreign countries. Disclosure of infringements connected with the use of foreign funding has become more topical during last years, and taking into consideration, for instance, the volume of funds allocated to Estonia in the framework of various European Union support programmes more keen attention must be paid to this field of work in the future. According to the information received in collection process, most of the corruption risks connected with application and use of foreign funds are connected with infringement of procedural restrictions provided in the Anti-corruption Act. The most often infringed ban among procedural restrictions is the one prohibiting transactions with oneself or transactions including other conflicts of interests. These are the cases, where officials participating in the application processes for foreign subsidies direct foreign funds to the business enterprises connected with themselves or with their family members or relatives/kinsmen, and thus earn illegal corruptive profit.

In 2004 the Security Police prosecuted the Head and the latter Adviser of the IT-department of the Labour Market Board Ülo-Karla Kask for misuse of official position. During the preliminary investigation it was



ascertained that Ülo-Karla Kask participated in the assessment committee considering international public procurement proclaimed by the Ministry of Financial Affairs for developing a new self-service information system SelveIS for the Labour Market Board. The committee decided that the best tender comes from the consolidated company where Ltd. Trillian Infosüsteemid led by the son of Ülo-Karla Kask had shareholdings. It was international procurement financed by Phare 2000 programme with the total cost of over 3 million EEK. Before participation in this committee Ülo-Karla Kask signed the independence and confidentiality declaration required in case of international procurements, asserting his independence in relation to all parties that benefit by the results of the assessment process. It is noteworthy that Ülo-Karla Kask assessed the tender of the mentioned consolidated company near-maximum points. By preferring this consolidated company Ülo-Karla Kask guaranteed constant income to the enterprise where his son had partnership, because only in 2003 Trillian Infosüsteemid received nearly 1.7 million EEK.

Besides the above mentioned it was ascertained during the preliminary investigation of the same criminal case that Ülo-Karla Kask had arranged conclusion of several other IT-contracts with Ltd. Trillian Infosüsteemid and Ltd. Trillian, led by his son, amounting over 1.2 million EEK. With such illegal activity Ülo-Karla Kask infringed procedural restrictions provided in the Anti-corruption Act, because according to the law an official is not allowed to make decisions or participate in making decisions connected with his official duties that would influence the business interests of the official's family members and relatives. The court convicted Ülo-Karla Kask of misuse of official position and punished him with 2 years conditional imprisonment with 3 years probationary period.


## From Investigation of Timeless Crimes to Information War

Crimes against humanity and war crimes have been investigated in Estonia for nearly ten years. During that time ten eager executors of Red Terror of the former Soviet Union – persons, who deported innocent people, as well as murderers of forest brothers (local partisans) – have been convicted in Estonian courts. In relation to two of them – Pjotr Kislyi and August Kolk, the executors of the 1949 March deportation in Saaremaa – the court judgement entered into force in 2004. Already on October 10, 2003, Saare County Court convicted both under Article 61-1 of the Criminal Code of crime against humanity. On January 27, 2004, Tallinn District Court did not satisfy submitted appellations. On April 21, 2004, the Supreme Court decided not to hear appeals in cassation submitted on the decision of the District Court.

There are different ways to condemn terror-regimes. Already on June 19, 2002, the Riigikogu with its declaration on the crimes of occupation regime in Estonia explicitly expressed the attitude of Estonia and Estonian nation towards the occupation of Nazis and towards communist occupation. There is no doubt that it was an important step in formation of our legal system proceeding from historical experience. Unfortunately the weakness of such declarations lies in the possibility to suppress their message, however reasonable, with active anti- and disinformation.

It is a decision of an independent judicial system of a democratic state, which gives objective and indisputable ground to refer to somebody as a criminal. Judgements of conviction inevitably indicate the criminal nature of the regime of violence and its authorities that united the criminals. Judgements of conviction in question will remain as fixed points independent of momentary response of media.

Evidently the latter has drawn Russia's information attacks, unwelcome to our investigators, upon the investigation of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Estonia. Actually these attacks against the activity of the Republic of Estonia and against the Security Police Board have continued for years already and we have consistently pointed it out in our previous Annuals, as well. Thus, drawing public attention to current "information war" by the Government in 2004 was no revolutionary moment for the Security Police, sooner continuous confirmation of support from the whole state machinery to our activity so far.



In 2004 there was a certain change of policy in the contents of Russia's information attacks. If the earlier anti-Estonia articles and statements were above all intended for Russia's own citizens and the Russian-speaking population of the neighbouring countries, then recently attempts to influence the opinion of the decision-makers of the third countries (first of all West-European states and the USA) about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in negative direction have increased.

It is easy for Russian authorities to soil the investigation of timeless crimes and through that the whole legal protection system of Estonia in the eyes of their society of totalitarian traditions. Firstly: very much on objective grounds National Socialism that existed in Germany during 1920-1945 is a synonym of EVIL for most Russians and the crimes committed and mistakes made by those who fought against it are as though automatically and unconditionally pardoned. Secondly, over decades people have got accustomed to communist regime, even with the terror and economic depression that has accompanied it.

Прибалтийские эсэсовцы сражались с мирными жител...ми карательными операциями против мирных жителей

http://www.rg.ru/2005/04/08/prilabaltika-karateli.html

Вы находитесь в разделе: [Общество](#) / [Наука и технологии](#) / [История](#)

# РОССИЙСКАЯ ГАЗЕТА

Вернуться на главную

Официально Статьи Документы Интервью Свежий выпуск

## Каталог

- Политика
- Экономика
- Безопасность
- В мире
- Общество
- Культура
- Спорт
- Рубрики
- Официальные сайты
- Фоторепортажи

## Приложения

- Российская бизнес-газета
- Союз. Беларусь-Россия
- Российская газета - Неделя

## Регионы

- Новости регионов
- Верхняя Волга
- Волга-Урал
- Вся Сибирь
- Дальний Восток
- Запад России
- Западная Сибирь

### Клеймо СС не смывается

Документы опровергают попытки обелить прибалтийских карателей

Тимофей Борисов  
Дата публикации 8 апреля 2005 г.

В руки нашего специального корреспондента попали архивные документы, доступ к которым ограничен. Они хранят тайну "левиной смерти", от рук которых в годы Второй мировой войны погибли многие тысячи ни в чем не повинных людей.

### Каратели

Далеко не все знают, что на оккупированных территориях нацисты создавали легионы фашистской гвардии из местных, национальных кадров. Именовались они "добровольческими дивизиями СС". К концу 1942 года почти каждая из действовавших на Восточном фронте гитлеровских дивизий имела 1-2 "восточные" роты, а корпус - роту или батальон.

Не стала исключением и Латвия. На стороне гитлеровцев воевали около 165 тысяч латышских легионеров. 16 марта 1944 года даже была проведена совместная операция двух дивизий латышского добровольческого легиона СС под Волквеем. Но документы свидетельствуют о том, что "борцы за независимость" не столько кормили в окопах ашей, сколько выполняли самую грязную работу в тех случаях, когда германское командование не хотело, так сказать, "пачкать руки". И прославились прибалтийские эсэсовцы не героическими сражениями с Красной Армией, а жесточайшими карательными операциями против мирных жителей, прежде всего белорусов. Только за февраль и март 1944 года каратели из латышской дивизии СС уничтожили в одной лишь Витебской области 138 деревень, расстреляли и повесили 17 тысяч человек и угнали в рабство в Германию еще 13 тысяч.

### Новости дня

- В Министерстве обороны состоялись российско-афганские переговоры
- Комментарий МИД в связи с информацией о гибели россиян в Афганистане
- Противники терроризма собрались у Останкино

### 60 лет Победы в Великой Отечественной войне

- Ярузельскому отомстили за прозвук в Россию
- Запущен сайт "Победители" о Великой Отечественной войне
- Автограф с Рейхстага вернулся к яватору

Еще 210 материалов

### Страницы истории

- Завод Радинский: в новой книге читателей ждет сюрприз
- Особый визит

Go to: <http://www.rg.ru/2005/05/17/radinsky.html>

Typical examples of news and articles written following the guidelines of Russia's professional information-war ideologists.





Examples of the doctrines and practice of information war.

Some of Russia's impeachments and accusations on Estonia are explained by presumption characteristic of totalitarian society that any activity with extensive public influence can be nothing but political request of concerned party. Independence of investigative bodies and courts, and obligation to observe law (including international standards) is elementary only for democratic state, not for authoritarian way of thinking. In other words – the destructive criticism towards investigation of crimes against humanity and war crimes often expresses the corruption of the critics themselves.

The latest public opinion polls in Russia indicate that the attitude of people towards the Baltic States is sooner negative than positive. Thus appropriate propaganda makes it easy for Russian authorities to create fictitious external enemy in order to distract people's attention and potential dissatisfaction from internal problems. Russia's clinging to its Stalinist past, its justification and praising, and rejection of Stalinist-era crimes probably results from necessities of domestic policy. By now they have reached to the problem how to serve this to the rest of the world in the situation, where the new members of the European Union and NATO have enriched these unions with their historical experience.

It is not surprising in the least that in its campaigns aimed West Russia exploits the method acquired at home – pointing at the enemy. One of the few connectors between the Stalinist Soviet Union and Western

democracies was their common enemy – the National Socialist Germany. It is sufficient to rename communists to anti-fascists and it will become difficult for a lot of West-Europeans and Americans to perceive the concept of the crime of communism. Unfortunately, a lot of people there (as well as in Russia) are not aware that not all East-Europeans divided to communists and Nazis. Or if they do know, they do not recall it at once, because they do not and cannot think about us all the time.

In such situation Estonia and our law enforcement authorities have no other choice than to investigate diligently the crimes committed by both occupation powers – Adolf Hitler's Germany and Jossif Stalin's Soviet Union. Important is the fact that the crimes under investigation were aimed against Estonia and against common principal values of the democratic world, whether the criminal was a Nazi or a communist. As far as we proceed from this principle with clear conscience Estonia has no reason to be afraid that Russia's propagandistic attacks via the West might be successful. Persistence in presumption of innocence and other principles of democratic legal order may require much strength of mind under the conditions of moral suasion from outside.

Therefore we can come to a simple conclusion: investigation of totalitarian crimes in Estonia has definitely influenced and will continuously influence "information war" that was brought to public attention. The investigators of the Security Police will not be influenced by



Still-frames from propagandistically orientated news programme of the Russian TV-channel RTR Planeta showing Estonian-birth Venezuelan businessman Harry Männil, stamped as war criminal (Sunday, March 20, 2005, at 7:30 p.m.). Vocabulary familiar from the Soviet era, carefully chosen images of Venezuela, Israel, Tallinn and archival data, interviews with several irrelevant persons. Excellent example of how Russian media makes efforts to make empty sacks stand.



propagandistic pressure to one direction or the other. The foreign country's aggressive articles and statements attacking Estonia are sooner good material for analytics, who can discover from there different methods of the propagandistic vocabulary of the great power – from intentional smear or incompetent treatment of facts to concealed threats on the highest level. Now some examples:

On March 12, 2004, in his interview to ITAR-TASS the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Juri Fedotov said among other things: *"Promoting persons who have cooperated with Nazis at the same time, when trials against anti-fascists take place, arouses indignation."/>*.../ 17 Nazi-criminals are said to be in freedom in Estonia, but Kapo shows no interest in it."

The mentioned 17 Nazi-criminals are probably the decorated members of the 36th Estonian Police Battalion in the list given to the Security Police Board by the Director of the Israel Bureau of Simon Wiesenthal Centre Efraim Zuroff in summer 2002.

Firstly, the list contains 16 names, which in itself is not a big mistake, but indicates to the shallowness of the work of the Under Secretary's advisors. Secondly, it has been certified that the persons in this list were awarded the II Class Iron Cross for personal courage in the battle of Stalingrad, stopping the attack of the Red Army at external front of siege zone. Thirdly, the Security Police ascertained immediately that at least 9 persons in this list are already dead, the residence location and data about the death of the rest are not available, but they certainly do not live in Estonia. The Security Police informed publicity of these facts at once, because initiating criminal procedure was impossible. Relevant information has been accessible on the web page of the Security Police all the time.

If we analyse the formulation of the Under Secretary's quotation, we see that the phrase "are said to be" is an attempt to be exempt from responsibility in case the fact is false. The statement "Kapo shows no interest in it" cannot be assessed otherwise than smear. The Under

Secretary's quoting of Efraim Zuroff's incompetent statement even more incompetently is a significant example of how one lie gives birth to another lie and at the same time a useful lesson to add into the A-B-C book of information war (if such a book should be published one day) about why respectable silence is not always the best way to serve national interests.

On the background of increasing Russia's media attacks in the summer and at the beginning of autumn 2004 an organisation called *Public Union against Neo-fascism and National Hatred* was established. Arnold Meri, an acknowledged suspect in the criminal case of investigation of 1949 mass deportation at Hiiumaa became the leader of this organisation. It is welcome that there are unions that want to fight against the desire of totalitarianism in society. Another question is, whether such organisation should be led by a person, who has openly declared that the Soviet-era deportations carried out in Estonia in 1941 and 1949 were correct and necessary actions.

Russia's administration has made some scary statements lately. The most recent example is from February 23, 2005, when at the Russia-USA summit in Slovakia the President of Russia Vladimir Putin justified the policy of the Soviet Union in concluding Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Putin announced with surprising cynicism that the Pact was necessary for guaranteeing the security of the Soviet Union. The fact that it all happened on account of the independence of the Baltic States, Finland and Poland did not seem to have any importance. Thus Putin has practically made it clear that, given a chance, he would act like Stalin did.

In 2005 Russia, seriously purposing the rehabilitation of Stalinism, doubtlessly continues similar propaganda attacks against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The objects of these propaganda attacks might be other countries, as well – e.g. Ukraine, Georgia, Finland, Poland etc. The II World War will not turn into patrimony of historians for some time, yet.

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